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Privacy Amplification Against Active Quantum Adversaries
Gil Cohen∗ Thomas Vidick†
Abstract
Privacy amplification is the task by which two cooperating parties transform a shared weak secret,
about which an eavesdropper may have side information, into a uniformly random string uncorrelated
from the eavesdropper. Privacy amplification against passive adversaries, where it is assumed that the
communication is over a public but authenticated channel, can be achieved in the presence of classical
as well as quantum side information by a single-message protocol based on strong extractors.
In 2009 Dodis and Wichs devised a two-message protocol to achieve privacy amplification against
active adversaries, where the public communication channel is no longer assumed to be authenticated,
through the use of a strengthening of strong extractors called non-malleable extractors which they intro-
duced. Dodis and Wichs only analyzed the case of classical side information.
We consider the task of privacy amplification against active adversaries with quantum side informa-
tion. Our main result is showing that the Dodis-Wichs protocol remains secure in this scenario provided
its main building block, the non-malleable extractor, satisfies a notion of quantum-proof non-malleability
which we introduce. We show that an adaptation of a recent construction of non-malleable extractors
due to Chattopadhyay et al. is quantum proof, thereby providing the first protocol for privacy amplifica-
tion that is secure against active quantum adversaries. Our protocol is quantitatively comparable to the
near-optimal protocols known in the classical setting.
1 Introduction
Privacy amplification designates the transformation, by two cooperating parties Alice and Bob, of a weak
shared secret X, about which an adversary may have side information E, into a shared secret Z that
is uniform and uncorrelated from the adversary’s side information. This task, introduced by Bennett et
al. [BBR88], forms the last step of most classical as well as quantum key agreement protocols. More
broadly, privacy amplification plays an important role in symmetric-key cryptography by providing a means
for Alice and Bob to refresh the quality of a shared secret in order to securely use it as a cryptographic key.
Privacy amplification requires interaction between the users, and all communication is naturally as-
sumed to take place over a public channel. Often the channel is also assumed to be authenticated, so
that the adversary may eavesdrop on the messages exchanged but may not modify them without being de-
tected. Single-message protocols based on two-universal families of hash functions, or more generally on
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strong randomness extractors, provide an efficient, information-theoretically secure solution for this sce-
nario [BBCM95], even when the passive adversary’s side information about the initial weak secret is a
quantum state [RK05].
Access to an authenticated channel cannot always be guaranteed, as establishing such a channel requires
either a shared secret key [Sti94] (which is the task privacy amplification aims to solve in the first place) or
computational assumptions. Maurer and Wolf [MW97] were the first to relax this assumption and consider
privacy amplification against active adversaries, who may intercept and modify the messages exchanged
between Alice and Bob at will. In this scenario the adversary may always force the protocol to abort, and
security requires that, conditioned on neither party aborting, the key they produce is uniformly distributed
and independent from the adversary’s side information.
Maurer and Wolf provide a solution for the case where the shared secret X has min-entropy rate larger
than 12 (equivalently, the eavesdropper’s best a priori probability of guessing X is smaller than 2−|X|/2; see
Section 2 for definitions). Subsequent works [RW03, KR09] showed how the task could be performed under
weaker requirements on the initial secret; however they required complex interactive protocols with a num-
ber of rounds that scales with the security parameter. In 2009 Dodis and Wichs [DW09] proposed the first
constant-round protocol, based on a novel cryptographic primitive they called a non-malleable extractor.
Although they were unable to provide an efficient construction of this primitive, a line of works in pseudo-
randomness has very recently led to constructions which, combined with the Dodis-Wichs framework, lead
to a two-round protocol for privacy amplification against active adversaries that has minimal requirements
on the weak secret and near-optimal entropy loss and communication complexity (see [Coh16c, Li16] and
references therein.)
While the aforementioned works provide a satisfactory solution, they only apply to the case of classical
adversaries, whose side information about the initial shared secret is restricted to a classical correlated
random variable. The essential role that privacy amplification plays in quantum key distribution (indeed,
it is in this context that Bennett et al. [BBR88] first introduced the problem), together with the increasing
necessity to consider the security of classical cryptography against quantum adversaries (so-called post-
quantum cryptography) raises the question: can privacy amplification be achieved against active quantum
adversaries? And if so, can one obtain protocols that are quantitatively comparable to those proven secure
in the classical setting?
Answering the analogue question for the scenario of passive quantum adversaries required substan-
tial work. Quantum information is known to provide an advantage for many information-theoretic prob-
lems [DHL+04, FHS13], and has been shown to lead to dramatic attacks on certain public-key [Sho99]
as well as private-key cryptographic tasks [DFNS13, KLLNP15]. Similarly, certain (admittedly contrived)
constructions of classically secure strong extractors have been shown to fail in the presence of quantum
side information [GKK+08], so that quantum-proof security can only be established on a case-by-case
basis. Nevertheless, by now many constructions are known, achieving parameters that come close to opti-
mal [RK05, TSSR11, DPVR12].
Privacy amplification against active quantum adversaries presents a particularly challenging scenario,
involving multiple rounds of interaction and the possibility for the adversary to interfere with each round
in a way that depends on its quantum side information. Is it possible to guarantee protection against such
attacks?
1.1 Our results
The main contribution of this work is to answer the above question in the affirmative. We provide the first
proof of security of a privacy amplification protocol against active quantum adversaries. We establish our
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result by adapting the Dodis-Wichs framework for privacy amplification: we show that provided its main
ingredient, the non-malleable extractor, satisfies the appropriate notion of quantum-proof security which we
introduce, the Dodis-Wichs protocol remains secure against active quantum adversaries. We then proceed
to establish that a certain construction of non-malleable extractors, directly inspired from the framework
of [CGL15], satisfies the required notion of quantum-proof security. Our construction yields a non-malleable
extractor, and a privacy amplification protocol, that have parameters comparable to the best known in the
classical setting.
As classical non-malleable extractors have found further exciting uses in pseudorandomness [CZ16] on
top of their original application to cryptography [DW09], quantum-proof non-malleable extractors may find
many further uses beyond their application to privacy amplification. We discuss our construction in more
detail below, before explaining the application to privacy amplification against active quantum adversaries.
Non-malleable extractors
Informally, an extractor is a deterministic procedure Ext that takes as input two independent classical random
variables, a source X and a seed Y, and is such that, provided the source has high enough entropy and the
seed is uniformly distributed, Ext(X, Y) is (close to) uniformly distributed. Applications to cryptography
motivate the study of extractors in the presence of an adversary holding side information E about the source:
the assumption is now that X, E may be correlated but are such that the conditional entropy of X, conditioned
on E, is large; the desired outcome is that Ext(X, Y) should be uniform and uncorrelated with E. In
many applications (including privacy amplification) it is desirable to impose an even stronger requirement,
whereby the seed Y is leaked to the adversary: Ext(X, Y) should be uniform conditioned on E and Y, a
condition which we may succinctly express as
(Ext(X, Y), Y, E) ≈ (U, Y, E),
where U is uniform. Such a function Ext is called a strong extractor.
The ubiquitous use of extractors in pseudorandomness and cryptography requires the consideration of
even stronger notions of security, where the adversary is given additional side information about the random
variables X and Y. Motivated by privacy amplification against active adversaries (which we discuss in detail
below) Dodis and Wichs introduced the notion of a non-malleable extractor nmExt, where the additional
information consists in the output Z′ = nmExt(X, Y′) of the extractor, evaluated on the same source X,
but for a different choice of seed Y′ 6= Y that may be chosen by the adversary based on Y and its side
information E. Thus it is now required that
(Ext(X, Y), Ext(X, Y′), Y, Y′, E) ≈ (U, Ext(X, Y′), Y, Y′, E), (1)
where U is uniformly distributed, and Y′ is any random variable such that Y′ 6= Y. Here one must be careful
how Y′ is determined — for instance, if Y′ was allowed to depend on both Y and X then Y′ could easily
encode information about Z, and (1) would be impossible to satisfy. The natural requirement, considered
in [DW09], is that Y′ is obtained as the outcome of a function T : (Y, E) → Y′ with no fixed points (i.e.
Y′ 6= Y for every E = e). We extend this condition to the case of quantum side information E by requiring
Y′ to be produced as the outcome of an arbitrary quantum map T acting on the quantum register holding E
and a classical register containing Y, whose output is a Y′ 6= Y together with a possibly modified quantum
register E′ that forms the adversary’s updated side information. (See Definition 28 for a formal definition.)
It is not a priori obvious that non-malleable extractors should exist. Dodis and Wichs gave a probabilistic
argument showing their existence with parameters essentially matching those of the best-possible strong
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extractors. Explicit constructions required much more work, but are now known to simultaneously achieve
almost the optimal seed length, output length, and error guarantee.
To the best of our knowledge, the case of quantum side information has not been considered before.
When considering quantum side information, existence proofs based on probabilistic arguments no longer
apply, so that it is not even clear that quantum-proof non-malleable extractors exist. Even for the simpler
task of establishing security of strong extractors against quantum side information, few general techniques
are known (see nevertheless [KT08] for the case of one-bit extractors, and [BFS15] for recent results in
this direction), so that the task of proving quantum-proof security of a non-malleable extractor may appear
daunting at first. Our first main contribution is a proof that a specific classical construction, with very good
parameters, is quantum-proof.
Theorem 1. There exists a universal constant r ≥ 1 such that for any integers n, k and any ε > 0 such
that k = Ω(logr(n/ε)) there exists a (k, ε) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m where d = O(logr(n/ε)) and m = k/4. Moreover, nmExt can be computed in time
poly(n, log(1/ε)).
Our proof closely follows some of the arguments that were used for the construction of non-malleable
extractors in the classical setting. In particular, we give a quantum-proof analog of the so-called flip-flop
primitive [Coh15] (see Section 3.3) and use it to construct a quantum-proof correlation breaker with ad-
vice [CGL15, Coh16b] (see Section 3.4).
The key difficulty in analyzing the flip-flop primitive and the correlation breaker consists in formulating,
and manipulating, conditional (in)dependence relations between random variables, a task that is made all the
more subtle when considering quantum side information. We find that the formalism of quantum Markov
chains, previously employed in the analysis of quantum-proof two-source extractors in [AFPS15], provides
a powerful way to express such relations. For instance, the conditions on the adversary’s choice of the
modified seed Y′ expressed above can be succinctly formulated as the requirement that X − E−YY′ forms
a Markov chain such that Y 6= Y′ always holds. It is then required that (1) holds, under the additional
assumptions that (Y, E) ∼ (Um, E) and that the conditional entropy of X, conditioned on E, is sufficiently
large. We refer to Section 3.1 for more on this.
We remark that more recent constructions of classical non-malleable extractors [CL16, Coh16a, Coh16c,
Li16] achieve even better parameters than the ones provided in Theorem 1. These constructions rely on
improved correlation breakers with advice, which in turn are based on independence-preserving merg-
ers [CS16]. In particular, these constructions do not rely on the flip-flop primitive. We believe it may
be possible to extend our approach to show quantum-proof security of these constructions as well; here we
made the choice of concentrating on a construction which we believe achieves a good tradeoff in terms of
parameter strength versus technical intricacy.
Privacy amplification and the Dodis-Wichs protocol
In this section we turn to give a somewhat more formal introduction to the problem of privacy amplification.
Alice and Bob share an n-bit random variable X such that Hmin(X|E) ≥ k, where E is the adversary’s side
information. Alice and Bob’s ultimate goal is to agree on an m-bit string R that is ε-close to uniform even
conditioned on the transcript of their interaction, which is accessible to Eve. Further, in the active setting,
Eve is allowed to tamper with the communication to her liking, modifying the messages exchanged by Alice
and Bob. (Since Eve may always impersonate either party and thereby completely confuse the other, Alice
and Bob are allowed to produce a special “abort” symbol and the security requirement is that the produced
key be uniform and uncorrelated with E, conditioned on neither party aborting.) We refer to λ = log(1/ε)
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as the security parameter of the protocol. The relevant parameters measuring the quality of the protocol as
functions of n, λ are its round complexity (number of rounds required by the protocol), entropy loss (amount
of min-entropy lost during the protocol, namely, k −m, where m = |R|), communication complexity (total
number of bits communicated), and supported min-entropy (least value k for which the protocol is secure).
Dodis and Wichs gave a two-round protocol for privacy amplification secure against active adversaries.
The main ingredient in their protocol is a non-malleable extractor, which is combined with an information-
theoretically secure message authentication code (MAC) in an ingenious way in order to obtain security (see
Figure 3 for a description of the protocol). Our definition of quantum-proof non-malleable extractor is mo-
tivated by its use in this protocol, and we show that, with our definition, the Dodis-Wichs proof of security
extends to the case of active quantum adversaries. Together with our quantum-proof non-malleable extrac-
tor, given by Theorem 1, we obtain the following privacy amplification protocol against active quantum
adversaries.
Theorem 2. For every integer n and security parameter λ > 0 there exists an explicit two-round pri-
vacy amplification protocol against active quantum adversaries that supports min-entropy k = Ω(d), with
entropy-loss O(d), and communication complexity O(d), where d = poly(λ, log n).
Organization. We start with some preliminaries in Section 2, where the main notions pertaining to quan-
tum information and pseudorandomness required for our work are introduced. Section 3 contains our main
technical contribution, the quantum-proof security of a construction of correlation breaker with advice.
Section 4 describes our quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, and Section 5 explains the application to
privacy amplification against active quantum adversaries.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We write H for a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, L(H) for the linear operators on H, Pos(H) for pos-
itive semidefinite operators, and D(H) ⊂ Pos(H) for positive semidefinite operators of trace 1 (density
matrices). A linear map L(H) → L(H′) is CPTP if it is completely positive, i.e. T ⊗ Id(A) ≥ 0 for any
A ∈ Pos(H⊗ Cd), and trace-preserving.
We use capital letters A, B, . . . and X, Y, . . . to designate either classical discrete random variables or
quantum states represented by a density matrix. That is, we write X for a random variable distributed on a
finite alphabet Σ, with distribution Pr(X = x) = px, as well as for the density matrix ρX = ∑x∈Σ px|x〉〈x|.
Similarly, we write E for the reduced density ρE, so that e.g. (X, E) designates the classical-quantum (cq
for short) state ρXE = ∑x |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE, where here the marginal probability Pr(X = x) = Tr(ρxE). It
will always be clear from context which letters designate classical random variables and which designate a
quantum system. For an integer m, Um denotes a random variable uniformly distributed over m-bit strings.
We write e.g. (X, E) ≈ε (X′, E′) to mean that ‖ρXE − ρX′E′‖1 ≤ ε, where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the L1 norm on
matrices. Note that in case both X and E are classical random variables this reduces to twice the statistical
distance. If ε = 0 we sometimes use the symbol ∼, i.e. Y ∼ Ud designates a random variable that is
uniformly distributed over d-bit strings.
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2.2 Quantum information
We refer to the textbook [Wil13] for background on quantum information. Here we only recall the notions
that will be most directly useful to us.
Definition 3. Let ρXE ∈ D(C2n ⊗H) be a cq state. The min-entropy of X conditioned on E is defined as
Hmin(X|E)ρ = max{λ ≥ 0 : ∃σE ∈ Pos(H), Tr(σ) ≤ 1, s.t. 2−λ IdX ⊗σE ≥ ρXE}.
When the state ρ with respect to which the entropy is measured is clear from context we simply write
Hmin(X|E) for Hmin(X|E)ρ. We call a cq state ρXE (also (X, E)) an (n, Hmin(X|E))-source.
It is often convenient to consider the smooth min-entropy, which is obtained by maximizing the min-
entropy over all cq states in an ε-neighborhood of ρXE. The definition of this neighborhood depends on a
choice of metric; the canonical choice is the “purified distance”. Since this choice will not matter for us we
defer to [Tom15] for a precise definition.
Definition 4. Let ε ≥ 0 and ρXE ∈ D(C2n ⊗H) a cq state. The ε-smooth min-entropy of X conditioned
on E is defined as
Hεmin(X|E)ρ = max
σXE∈B(ρXE,ε)
Hmin(X|E)σ,
where B(ρXE, ε) is the ball of radius ε around ρXE, taken with respect to the purified distance.
Dual to the min-entropy is the conditional max-entropy Hmax(X|E). Here the only property we will
need is that Hεmax(X|E) ≤ log |Σ| for any cq state (X, E) such that X ∈ Σ and ε ≥ 0. In addition we will
make frequent use of the following chain rule for the smooth conditional min-entropy.
Lemma 5 (Chain rule, [VDTR13]). There is a universal constant c ≥ 0 such that the following holds. For
any ε′, ε′′ > 0 and ε > ε′ + ε′′, for any tripartite state ρABC,
Hεmin(A|BC) ≥ Hε
′
min(AB|C)− Hε
′′
max(B|C) + c log(ε− ε′ − ε′′). (2)
Markov chains provide a convenient formalism to express simple conditional independence relations
between random variables, and we will use the following notation extensively. In the definition I(X : Y |E)
refers to the quantum condititional mutual information, I(X : Y |E) = H(XE) + H(YE) − H(E) −
H(XYE), where H denotes the von Neumann entropy.
Definition 6. We say that a tripartite state ρXEY is a Markov state if I(X : Y |E) = 0. We often write the
same condition as the condition that X − E−Y is a quantum Markov chain.
We note that all quantum Markov chains considered in this paper will take the form X − E− Y, where
X, Y are classical random variables and E may designate a quantum system. The following proposition
provides a structural characterization of such quantum Markov chains.
Proposition 7 (Theorem 6, [HJPW04]). Let ρXEY be a Markov state such that X and Y are classical. Then
we can write E = E1TE2 with T classical and
ρXEY = ∑
t
∑
x,y
p(t)p(x|t)p(y|t) |x〉〈x| ⊗ (ρxtE1 ⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗ ρ
yt
E2
)⊗ |y〉〈y|. (3)
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2.3 Extractors
We first recall the definition of a strong quantum-proof extractor. Recall the notation (X, E) ≈ε (X′, E′) for
‖ρXE − ρX′E′‖1 ≤ ε, and Um for a random variable uniformly distributed over m-bit strings.
Definition 8. Let n, d, k, m be integers and ε ≥ 0. A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a
strong (k, ε) quantum-proof extractor if for all cq states ρXE ∈ D(C2n ⊗H) with Hmin(X|E) ≥ k, and for
a uniform Y ∈ {0, 1}d independent of ρXE,
(Ext(X, Y), Y, E) ≈ε (Um, Y, E).
Throughout the paper we make use of the following explicit strong quantum-proof extractor.
Theorem 9 ([DPVR12]). For any integers n, m and for any ε > 0 there exists an explicit strong (2m, ε)
quantum-proof extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log2(n/ε) · log m).
We will often apply extractors to cq states ρXE on which we only have a bound on the smooth min-
entropy, and to seeds that are only close to being uniformly distributed. The following lemma shows how
the errors add up in this case.
Lemma 10. There is a universal constant c > 0 such that the following holds.1 Let n, m, k, d be integers,
ε ≥ 0 and Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m a strong (k, ε) quantum-proof extractor. Let X ∈ {0, 1}n ,
Y ∈ {0, 1}d and E a quantum system such that X − E − Y is a quantum Markov chain. Assume that
HεXmin(X|E) ≥ k + log(1/ε′) + 1 and (Y, E) ≈εY (Ud, E) for some εX , εY, ε′ > 0. Then
∥∥ρExt(X,Y)YE −Um ⊗ ρYE
∥∥
1
≤ c (ε + ε′ + εX + εY).
Proof sketch. The lemma essentially follows from Lemma 17 in [AFPS15] (which is more general), but our
formulation is slightly different; we sketch the argument. Using the decomposition (3) of a Markov state we
may write
ρXEY = ∑
t
∑
x,y
p(t)p(x|t)p(y|t) |x〉〈x| ⊗ (ρxtE1 ⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗ ρ
yt
E2
)⊗ |y〉〈y|.
By monotonicity of the trace distance the condition (Y, E) ≈εY (Ud, E) directly implies (Y, T, E2) ≈εY
(Ud, T, E2). Conditioned on T, (X, E1) and (Y, E2) are independent, thus (X, Y, E) ≈εY (X, Ud, E).
Next using the definition of the smooth min-entropy it follows using an argument similar as in the proof
of [AFPS15, Lemma 18] that there exists a state σXYE such that X − E − Y is a quantum Markov chain,
Y ∼ Ud, Hmin(X|E) ≥ k, and ‖σXYE − ρXYE‖1 ≤ 3(εX + εY) + ε′. We then conclude by the definition of
a strong extractor.
2.4 Message authentication codes
We make use of standard constructions of information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication
codes, or MAC. This security notion is defined as follows.
Definition 11. A function MAC : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}t is an εMAC-information-theoretically secure
one-time message authentication code if for any function A : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}d × {0, 1}t it holds that
Pr
k←U{0,1}ℓ
(
MAC(k, m′) = σ′ ∧ m′ 6= m|(m′, σ′) = A(MAC(k, m)) ≤ εMAC.
1The constant can be taken c = 6.
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Efficient constructions of MAC satisfying the conditions of Definition 11 are known. The following
proposition summarizes some parameters that are achievable using a construction based on polynomial
evaluation.
Proposition 12 (Proposition 1 in [KR09]). For any εMAC > 0 there exists an efficient family of εMAC-
information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication codes {MAC : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}t}d∈N with t ≤ log d + log(1/εMAC) and ℓ ≤ 2t.
2.5 Error correcting codes
We recall the standard definition of error correcting codes.
Definition 13. Let Σ be some set. A mapping ECC: Σk → Σn is called an error correcting code with
relative distance δ if for any x, y ∈ Σk the Hamming distance between ECC(x) and ECC(y) is at least δn.
The rate of the code, denoted by ρ, is defined by ρ = k/n. We say that the alphabet size of the code is |Σ|.
Theorem 14 ([GS95] (see also [Sti09])). Let p be any prime number and let m be an even integer. Set
q = pm. For every ρ ∈ [0, 1] and for any large enough integer n there exists an efficiently-computable rate
ρ linear error correcting code ECC : Fρnq → Fnq with relative distance δ such that
ρ + δ ≥ 1− 1√
q− 1 .
3 Quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice
The main ingredient in the construction of the non-malleable extractor to be presented in Section 4.1 is a
pseudorandom object called a correlation breaker with advice [CGL15, Coh16b]. Informally, a correlation
breaker with advice is a procedure AdvCB : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}a → {0, 1}m that takes as input a
sample from a source X ∈ {0, 1}n, a seed Z ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and a string α ∈ {0, 1}a which we refer to as the
advice string. AdvCB is designed to break correlations in the following sense. For any pair of arbitrarily
correlated random variables (Z, Z′) that are jointly independent from a second pair (X, X′) and such that Z
is uniformly distributed and X has sufficient min-entropy, and for any advice strings α 6= α′, it holds that
(AdvCB(X, Z, α), AdvCB(X′, Z′, α′)) ≈ (Um, AdvCB(X′, Z′, α′)),
that is, AdvCB(X, Z, α) is uncorrelated from AdvCB(X′, Z′, α′) and uniform.
Although breaking correlations between random variables is one of the fundamental problems one en-
counters in the area of pseudorandomness, correlation breakers were first explicitly considered as an in-
dependent “primitive” in [Coh15], and correlation breakers with advice were first considered implicitly
in [CGL16] and then explicitly starting with [Coh16b]. For a detailed discussion we refer to [Coh16a]. The
construction presented in this section is a simplified form of the one from [CGL15]. Our main technical
contribution is in proving that the latter construction is quantum proof. As a side contribution, we provide a
somewhat simpler and more streamlined analysis.
The main conceptual hurdle in extending the analysis from [CGL16] lies in finding the proper frame-
work in which to express the correlations that arise from quantum side information. As explained in the
introduction, we find it convenient to work with simple quantum Markov chains, that will typically take
the form X − E − Y, where X and Y are classical random variables and E is quantum. As the analysis
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progresses, additional random variables H = Ht, . . . , H1 will be considered, but these will be such that the
condition that X−HE−Y is a quantum Markov chain is preserved. This conditional independence will be
essential at all stages of the analysis.
To formalize this in Section 3.1 we describe an extension of the formalism of histories introduced
in [Coh15] to the case where quantum side information may be present. In Section 3.2 we recall the notion
of hierarchy of independence, a notion which can be traced back, in an implicit form, to [DP07, DW09].
Section 3.3 describes the flip-flop procedure [Coh15], which forms the main part of the analysis of the cor-
relation breaker with advice. The latter is defined in Section 3.4, where the ingredients from the previous
sections are put together.
3.1 (L, E, R)-Histories
Definition 15. Let L, R be classical random variables and E a quantum system such that L − E − R
forms a quantum Markov chain (or Markov chain for short). A sequence of random variables H =
(Ht, . . . , H1) is called an (L, E, R)-history if for each i, Hi is a deterministic function of (Hi−1, . . . , H1, L)
or (Hi−1, . . . , H1, R).
The following basic lemma shows that histories do not “break” the Markov chain condition.
Lemma 16. Suppose H is an (L, E, R)-history. Then L− EH− R is a quantum Markov chain.
An immediate corollary is that if H = (Ht, . . . , H1) is an (L, E, R)-history and H′ = (H′t′ , . . . , H′1)
an (L, EH, R)-history then their concatenation H′ ◦H = (H′t′ , . . . , H′1, Ht, . . . , H1) is an (L, E, R)-history.
The lemma will be used repeatedly without always mentioning it. Although the proof of the lemma is
simple we give a proof sketch as it arguably forms the only point in this paper where the fact that the side
information E is quantum needs to acknowledged explicitly; the main tool for this is the characterization of
quantum Markov chains from [HJPW04] recalled in Proposition 7.
Proof sketch of Lemma 16. Suppose H = H1. Then by definition H1 is a function of either L or R, and the
conclusion trivially holds. More precisely, suppose e.g. H1 is a function of L; then we can write
ρH1LER = ∑
ℓ,r,h1
p(h1|ℓ)pℓpr |h1〉〈h1| ⊗ |ℓ〉〈ℓ| ⊗ ρEℓ,r ⊗ |r〉〈r|.
Conditioning on H1 = h1,
ρH1=h1,LER = p(h1|ℓ)∑
ℓ,r
pℓpr |h1〉〈h1| ⊗ |ℓ〉〈ℓ| ⊗ ρEℓ,r ⊗ |r〉〈r|,
which clearly satisfies the Markov chain condition.
Now suppose H = (H1, H2) with e.g. H1 a function of L and H2 a function of H1 and R. Write
ρH2 H1LER = ∑
ℓ,r,h1,h2
p(h2|h1, r)p(h1|ℓ)pℓpr |h2, h1〉〈h2, h1| ⊗ |ℓ〉〈ℓ| ⊗ ρEℓ,r ⊗ |r〉〈r|.
Conditioning on (H1, H2) = (h1, h2),
ρH2=h2,H1=h1,LER = p(h2|h1, r)p(h1|ℓ)∑
ℓ,r
pℓpr |ℓ〉〈ℓ| ⊗ ρEℓ,r ⊗ |r〉〈r|,
where again the Markov condition is verified.
If H is longer the proof proceeds similarly via induction.
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3.2 Hierarchy of independence
A basic building block in the construction of the correlation breaker with advice is a mechanism that breaks
correlations between random variables in some weak sense. Informally speaking, the mechanism is com-
posed of a pair of efficiently-computable functions a, b : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}b with the following
property. For any quantum Markov chain XX′ − E − YY′ where Y is uniform and X | E has sufficient
entropy, it holds that A ≈ U where A = a(Y, X), and furthermore (B, A′, A) ≈ (U, A′, A) where
A′ = a(Y′, X′) and B = b(Y, X). In words, the A variable is uniform by itself, and furthermore the B
variable is uniform even conditioned on A′, A. This notion of independence was coined “hierarchy of in-
dependence” [CS16] and its implementation, which is based on alternating extraction, can be traced back
to [DP07, DW09]. In the following lemma we show that this implementation is quantum-proof. We proceed
with the formal treatment.
For a constant c ≥ 1 to be chosen sufficiently large, and for integers n, ℓ and ε > 0 we set the following
parameters:
s = c log3(n/ε),
b = c log3(ℓ/ε),
h = cs. (4)
We further assume that
n ≥ log3 ℓ,
ℓ ≥ h. (5)
We make use of the following building blocks:
• Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}b be the (2b, ε) strong quantum proof extractor that is given by
Theorem 9.
• Let Ext2 : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}s be the (2s, ε) strong quantum proof extractor that is given by
Theorem 9.
Note that by Theorem 9, Equation (5), and by taking the constant c introduced in (4) large enough,
explicit extractors with parameters as stated for Ext1 and Ext2 exist.
Lemma 17 (Hierarchy of independence). Let X, X′ ∈ {0, 1}n and Y, Y′ ∈ {0, 1}h be such that XX′− E−
YY′ is a quantum Markov chain. Let H be an (XX′, E, YY′)-history. Suppose that the following conditions
hold:
1. (Y, HE) ≈εY (Uh, HE) for some εY > 0 such that b, s, h = Ω(log(1/εY));
2. HεXmin(X|HE) ≥ 5b for some εX > 0.
Let Ys, Y′s denote the length s prefixes of Y, Y′ respectively. Let
A = Ext1(X, Ys), T = Ext2(Y, A), B = Ext1(X, T),
and
A′ = Ext1(X′, Y′s), T
′ = Ext2(Y′, A′), B′ = Ext1(X′, T′).
Then there exists η = O(εX + εY + ε) such that
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(i) (A, Y′, Y, HE) ≈η (Ub, Y′, Y, HE);
(ii) (T, A′, A, Y′s, Ys, HE) ≈η (Us, A′, A, Y′s, Ys, HE);
(iii) (B, T′, T, A′, A, Y′s , Ys, HE) ≈η (Ub, T′, T, A′, A, Y′s , Ys, HE).
Furthermore, H = (B′, B, T′, T, A′, A, Y′s , Ys) ◦ H is an (XX′, E, YY′)-history and HεX+εYmin (X|HE) ≥
HεXmin(X|HE)− 5b.
Proof. Item (i). Since Ext1 is a (2b, ε) strong quantum-proof extractor and as HεXmin(X|HE) ≥ 5b ≥
2b + Ω(log(1/εY)), it follows from Lemma 10 that
(A, Ys, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+ε) (Ub, Ys, HE). (6)
Conditioned on Ys, the random variable A is a deterministic function of X only. Similarly, the random
variable A′ is a deterministic function of X′ conditioned on Y′s . By Lemma 16, A′AX′X −Y′sYsHE− Y′Y
is a quantum Markov chain, thus (A, Y′, Y) ◦ H is an (XX′, E, YY′)-history and we may adjoin Y and Y′
to (6) to obtain Item (i). Moreover we note that H′ = (A′, A, Y′s, Ys) ◦H is an (XX′, E, YY′)-history.
Item (ii). Proceeding similarly as in (i), but now using that by the chain rule (2)
H2εYmin(Y|H′E) ≥ h− 2s−O(log(1/εY)) ≥ 2s + Ω(log(1/εY)),
Lemma 10 implies that
(T, A, Y′s , Ys, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+ε) (Us, A, Y′s, Ys, HE), (7)
To adjoin A′ note that T − AY′sYsHE− XX′ is a quantum Markov chain, so we can include X, X′ in (7) to
deduce
(T, X′, X, A, Y′s , Ys, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+ε) (Us, X′, X, A, Y′s , Ys, HE).
Using that A′ = Ext1(X′, Y′s) is a deterministic function of X′ and Y′s we may adjoin it as well, yielding
(ii). Finally we note that H′′ = (T′, T) ◦H′ is an (X′X, E, Y′Y)-history.
Item (iii). The last step is similar. First, using the chain rule (2),
HεX+εYmin (X|H′′E) ≥ HεXmin(X|HE)− 2b−O(log(1/εY)) ≥ 2b + Ω(log(1/εY)),
and it follows from (ii) and Lemma 10 that
(B, T, H′E) ≈O(εX+εY+ε) (Ub, T, H′E), (8)
Adjoining the remaining variables is done exactly as in the proof of (ii). The claim on the entropy loss of X
follows from a last application of (2).
3.3 The flip-flop procedure
The flip-flop procedure is described in Figure 1. The procedure takes as input three random variables
X ∈ {0, 1}n , Z ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and Y ∈ {0, 1}h, in addition to an “advice bit” α ∈ {0, 1}. It returns a
random variable O ∈ {0, 1}h . We write it as
FF : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}h × {0, 1} → {0, 1}h .
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Procedure FF : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}h × {0, 1} → {0, 1}h
For integers n, ℓ and for ε > 0 let s, b, h be integers as defined in (4).
Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}b be the (2b, ε) quantum proof extractor from Section 3.2.
Let Ext2 : {0, 1}h × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}s be the (2s, ε) quantum proof extractor from Section 3.2.
Let Ext3 : {0, 1}ℓ ×{0, 1}b → {0, 1}h be the (2h, ε) quantum proof extractor that is given by Theorem 9.
Let X ∈ {0, 1}n , Z ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and Y ∈ {0, 1}h be random variables, and α ∈ {0, 1}, provided as input to
the procedure.
Perform the following four steps:
1. (Flip) Define A = Ext1(X, Ys), T = Ext2(Y, A), B = Ext1(X, T).
2. (Intermission) If α = 0 then let Y = Ext3(Z, A). If α = 1 then let Y = Ext3(Z, B).
3. (Flop) Define A = Ext1(X, Ys), T = Ext2(Y, A), B = Ext1(X, T).
4. (Finale) If α = 0 then let O = Ext3(Z, B). If α = 1 then let O = Ext3(Z, A).
Return FF(X, Z, Y, α) = O.
Figure 1: The flip-flop procedure.
To analyze the performance of the procedure we consider two additional random variables Z′, Y′ which
may be correlated with Z and Y and a third random variable X′ which may be correlated with X, but is such
that XX′ −HE− ZZ′ is a Markov chain for some (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history H. We also assume that Y (resp.
Y′) is a deterministic function of Z and H (resp. Z′ and H).
Given two bits α, α′ ∈ {0, 1} we define random variables A, T, B, Y, and A, T, B, O, corresponding to
an execution of FF(X, Z, Y, α) (as described in Figure 1), and similarly primed random variables A′, T′, B′,
Y
′
, and A′, T′, B′, O′, corresponding to an execution of FF(X′, Z′, Y′, α′).
For the analysis of the flip-flop procedure we distinguish between three separate cases. The first two
correspond to α 6= α′. The “bad-then-good” case, corresponding to α = 0, is analyzed in Lemma 18. The
“good-then-bad” case, corresponding to α = 1, is analyzed in Lemma 21. Informally speaking, both these
cases correspond to a creation of independence. Finally Lemma 24 analyzes the case when α = α′, and
shows that in this case closeness to uniform, and independence when it exists, are preserved. The three
lemma all make the following assumptions:
Assumptions (⋆)
1. X, X′ ∈ {0, 1}n , Z, Z′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, Y, Y′ ∈ {0, 1}h, and α, α′ ∈ {0, 1};
2. XX′ − E − ZZ′ is a Markov chain, H an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history, and Y (resp. Y′) is a deterministic
function of Z and H (resp. Z′ and H);
3. (Y, HE) ≈εY (Uh, HE) for some εY > 0 such that b, s, h = Ω(log(1/εY));
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4. kX = HεXmin(X|HE) ≥ 9b for some εX > 0;
5. kZ = HεZmin(Z|HE) ≥ 11h for some εZ > 0.
Lemma 18 (Flip-Flop, Bad-then-Good). Assume (⋆), and suppose (α, α′) = (0, 1). Let
H = (B, O′) ◦ (Y′, Y, A′, A, Y′s, Ys) ◦ (A, B′, Y′, Y) ◦H.
Then H is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history and
(O, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, HE).
Moreover, HεX+2εYmin (X|HE) ≥ kX − 7b and HεZ+2εYmin (Z|HE) ≥ kZ − 7h.
Proof. We first analyze the “Flip” part of the procedure.
Claim 19 (Flip, Bad). At the end of the intermission it holds that
(Y, H1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, H1E),
where H1 = (B′, A, Y′, Y) ◦ H is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history. Moreover, HεX+εYmin (X|H1E) ≥ kX − 3b and
HεZ+εYmin (Z|H1E) ≥ kZ − 3h.
Proof. By (i) from Lemma 17, (A, Y′, Y, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+ε) (Ub, Y′, Y, HE). By the chain rule (2),
HεZ+εYmin (Z|Y′YHE) ≥ kZ − 2h−O(log(1/εY)) ≥ kZ − 3h.
Using that A− Y′YHE− ZZ′ is a quantum Markov chain, by Lemma 10 and the assumption that Ext3 is
a strong quantum-proof extractor we deduce
(Y, A, Y′, Y, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, A, Y′, Y, HE).
Conditioned on Y′, the random variable B′ is a function of X′ only while conditioned on A, Y is a function
of Y only, so we may adjoin B′ to conclude the claim. The bounds on the entropy loss follow directly from
the chain rule (2) and the assumption that b, h = Ω(log(1/εY)).
Next we turn to the “Flop” part of the procedure.
Claim 20 (Flop, Good). At the end of the finale it holds that
(O, H2E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, H2E),
where H2 = (B, O′) ◦ (Y′, Y, A′, A, Y′s, Ys) ◦H1 is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history. Moreover, HεX+2εYmin (X|H2E) ≥
kX − 7b and HεZ+2εYmin (Z|H2E) ≥ kZ − 7h.
Proof. To prove the claim it will suffice to show that
(B, O′, H′1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Ub, O′, H′1E), (9)
where H′1 = (Y
′
, Y, A
′
, A, Y
′
s, Ys) ◦H1 is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history. Indeed once (9) has been proven, the
claim will follow directly using Lemma 10 and that Ext3 is a strong quantum-proof extractor. The bounds
on the entropy loss are a direct consequence of the chain rule (2) and the prior bounds from Claim 19.
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We now prove (9). We first verify that we may apply Lemma 17 to X, X′, Y, Y′ with H1. By the
conclusion of Claim 19 and using that Y, Y′ are functions of Z, Z′ and H1 only, the Markov condition
XX′−H1E−YY′ is satisfied. Moreover the condition (Y, H1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, H1E) follows from
Claim 19.
By (iii) in Lemma 17 we conclude that
(B, T
′
, T, A
′
, A, Y
′
s, Ys, H1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Ub, T
′
, T, A
′
, A, Y
′
s, Ys, H1E).
Conditioned on T, the random variable B is a deterministic function of X, while conditioned on A′, O′ is
a deterministic function of Y′. Thus we may adjoin O′ to the above. None of the variables depend on T′
so it can be removed. Inserting Y fixes T so we may perform the substitution. Finally none of the random
variables depend on Y′ (aside from through Y′s), and it can be inserted as well, proving (9).
The lemma follows.
Lemma 21 (Flip-Flop, Good-then-Bad). Assume (⋆), and suppose (α, α′) = (1, 0). Let
H = (A, O′) ◦ (Y, B′, A′) ◦ (B, Y′) ◦ (Y′, Y, A′, A, Y′s , Ys) ◦H.
Then H is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history and
(O, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, HE).
Moreover, HεX+2εYmin (X|HE) ≥ kX − 7b and HεZ+2εYmin (Z|HE) ≥ kZ − 7h.
Proof. We first analyze the “Flip” part of the procedure.
Claim 22 (Flip, Good). At the end of the intermission it holds that
(Y, H1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, H1E),
where H1 = (B, Y
′
) ◦ (Y′, Y, A′, A, Y′s , Ys) ◦H is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history. Moreover, HεX+εYmin (X|H1E) ≥
kX − 5b and HεZ+εYmin (Z|H1E) ≥ kZ − 5h.
Proof sketch. The proof is analogous to the proof of Claim 20 and so we omit it. The only condition that
was really needed is (Y, HE) ≈ (Uh, HE), which is guaranteed by the assumptions (⋆) made in Lemma 21
as well as Lemma 18.
Next we turn to the “Flop” part.
Claim 23 (Flop, Bad). At the end of the finale it holds that
(O, H2E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, H2E),
where H2 = (A, O′) ◦ (Y, B′, A′) ◦H1 is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history. Moreover, HεX+2εYmin (X|H2E) ≥ kX −
7b and HεZ+2εYmin (Z|H2E) ≥ kZ − 7h.
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Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Claim 19. By the conclusion of Claim 22 we have that H1
is an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history and (Y, H1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, H1E). Conditioned on H1, the random
variable Y is a function of Z only, while A′ is a function of X′ only, so we may adjoin A′. Furthermore,
conditioned on Y′ the random variable B′ is a function of X′ only so we may adjoin it as well. Applying
Lemma 17 to the history B′, A′, H1, by item (i) in the lemma we get
(A, Y, B
′
, A
′
, H1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Ub, Y, B
′
, A
′
, H1E).
Conditioned on B′, the random variable O′ is a function of Z′ only, while conditioned on Y, the random
variable A is a function of X only, so we may adjoin O′ to the above to obtain
(A, O′, Y, B′, A′, H1E) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Ub, O′, Y, B
′
, A
′
, H1E). (10)
Conditioned on Y, the random variable A is a function of X only which is independent of Z. Using that
Ext3 is a quantum-proof strong extractor and Lemma 10 the conclusion of the claim follows from (10).
The lemma follows.
Finally we treat the case where the advice bits are identical.
Lemma 24 (Flip-Flop, Same Advice). Assume (⋆), and suppose α = α′. Then there exists an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-
history H (depending on α) such that (O, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, HE). Moreover, if the stronger as-
sumption (Y, Y′, HE) ≈εY (Uh, Y′, HE) holds then (O, O′, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+εZ+ε) (Uh, O′, HE). Finally,
HεX+2εYmin (X|HE) ≥ kX − 7b and HεZ+2εYmin (Z|HE) ≥ kZ − 7h.
Proof sketch. The proof of this lemma is similar (and in fact easier) than that of Lemma 18 and Lemma 21
so we only sketch the argument. The first part of the lemma is clear and follows directly from (i) and (ii) of
Lemma 17. Next we prove the second part. The cases α = α′ = 0 and α = α′ = 1 are similar; suppose e.g.
α = 0. We rely on the following simple claim.
Claim 25. Suppose XX′ − E− YY′ is a quantum Markov chain, (Y, Y′, E) ≈εY (Us, Y′, E), and let Ext :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}b be a (k, ε) strong quantum-proof extractor. Let X be such that HεXmin(X|E) ≥
k + b + Ω(log(1/εY)). Then,
(Ext(X, Y), Ext(X′, Y′), Y′, Y, E) ≈O(εX+εY+ε) (Ub, Ext(X′, Y′), Y′, Y, E).
Proof of Claim 25. By the chain rule (2), HεX+εYmin (X|Ext(X′, Y′)Y′E) ≥ k+Ω(log(1/εY)), and moreover
X Ext(X′, Y′)− Y′E− Y is a Markov chain with (Y, Y′, E) ≈εY (Us, Y′, E). The claim then follows from
Lemma 10.
It follows from the assumption (Y, Y′, HE) ≈εY (Uh, Y′, HE) and Claim 25 that
(A, A′, Y′, Y, HE) ≈O(εX+εY+ε) (Ub, A′, Y′, Y, HE).
We can then proceed similarly and propagate the independence condition to obtain the same conclusion for
Y and Y′, then A and A′, (T, T′), (B, B′) and finally (O, O′). The claims on the entropy loss follow from
the chain rule (2).
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Procedure AdvCB : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}a → {0, 1}m
Let n, a be integers and let ε > 0. Let s, b, h be the integers defined in (4) where we set ℓ = cah for some
large enough constant c. Note that this choice of ℓ meets the required conditions on s, b, h, ℓ as stated
in (5). Set kX = cab, m = kX/4.
Let Ext4 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}h → {0, 1}m be the (2m, ε) quantum-proof extractor that is given by Theo-
rem 9. By (4), h was chosen sufficiently large as required by Theorem 9.
Let X ∈ {0, 1}n , Z ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be random variables, and α ∈ {0, 1}a a fixed string, provided as input to the
procedure.
Perform the following steps:
1. Set Y0 to be the length h prefix of Z.
2. For i = 1, . . . , a define Yi = FF(X, Z, Yi−1, αi).
3. Define O = Ext4(X, Ya).
Return AdvCB(X, Z, α) = O.
Figure 2: The quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice.
3.4 Quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice
Our quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice is described in Figure 2. The following theorem states
its guarantees.
Theorem 26. Let X, X′ ∈ {0, 1}n and Z, Z′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be such that XX′ − E− ZZ′ is a quantum Markov
chain, and let H be an (XX′, E, ZZ′) history. Let b, h, s, a and ε > 0 be parameters of the procedure
AdvCB defined in Figure 2. Let kX be an integer and εX , εZ > 0 such that (Z, HE) ≈εZ (Uℓ, HE),
HεXmin(X|HE) ≥ kX , and assume further that b, h, s = Ω(a · log(1/(εXεZε))). Then there exists an
η = 2O(a)(εX + εZ + ε) such that for any fixed a-bit strings α 6= α′,
(AdvCB(X, Z, α), AdvCB(X′, Z′, α′), HE) ≈η (Uh, AdvCB(X′, Z′, α′), HE)
for some (XX′, E, ZZ′) history H that contains Z, Z′, H. Furthermore, Hηmin(X|HE) ≥ kX −m− 7ab.
Proof. Let g ∈ [a] be the least integer such that αg 6= α′g. By a repeated application of Lemma 24, there
exists an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history H1 such that (Yg−1, H1E) ≈η1 (Uh, H1E), where η1 = 2O(g)(εX + εZ +
ε). Moreover, Hη1min(X|H1E) ≥ kX − 7(g− 1)b and Hη1min(Z|H1E) ≥ kZ − 7(g− 1)h.
By Lemma 18 and Lemma 21,
(Yg, Y
′
g, H2E) ≈η2 (Uh, Y′g, H2E) (11)
for some η2 = O(η1) and H2 an (XX′, E, ZZ′)-history. Furthermore, H
η2
min(X|H2E) ≥ kX − 7gb and
H
η2
min(Z|H2E) ≥ kZ − 7gh.
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Once the key condition (11) has been established it only remains to verify that the condition propagates
through the remaining rounds (with controllable loss in error and entropy), irrespective of whether the advice
strings α, α′ are identical or differ. For this we apply Lemma 18, Lemma 21, or Lemma 24, depending
on the scenario; note that the conclusions of the first two lemmas are stronger than what is needed here.
Thus, application of the appropriate sequence of these lemmas allows us to conclude that there exists an
(XX′, E, ZZ′)-history H3 such that (Ya, Y′a, H3E) ≈η3 (Uh, Y′a, H3E) with η3 = 2O(a)(εX + εZ + ε).
Further, Hη3min(X|H3E) ≥ kX − 7ab.
Recall that O′ = Ext4(X′, Y′a). As X′ − Y′aH3E − Ya is a quantum Markov chain, we may adjoin O′
to obtain (Ya, O′, Y′a, H3E) ≈η3 (U, O′, Y′a, H3E). By the chain rule (2), HO(η3)min (X|O′, Y′a, H3E) ≥ kx −
7ab −m−O(log(1/η3)) ≥ 2m + Ω(log(1/η3)) when taking the constant c in (4) large enough. Hence,
using that Ext4 is a strong quantum-proof extractor, (O, Ya, O′, Y′a, H3E) ≈O(η3+ε) (Um, Ya, O′, Y′a, H3E).
The proof then follows by noting that one can adjoin Z, Z′ and then remove the excess random variables.
4 Quantum-proof non-malleable extractor
In this section we present our explicit construction of quantum-proof non-malleable extractors, for which we
introduce a formal definition in Section 4.1. The construction combines the correlation breaker with advice
described in Section 3 with an additional procedure called an advice generator, described in Section 4.2.
The final construction combines these ingredients following a general framework [CGL16]; we present this
in Section 4.3.
4.1 Quantum-proof non-malleable extractors
We generalize the notion of non-malleable extractor introduced in [DW09] to the setting of quantum side
information. Our definition is motivated by the use of non-malleable extractors to achieve privacy amplifi-
cation, as discussed in Section 5. We first extend the notion that the adversary may query the extractor on
any different seed Y′ than the seed Y actually used to the case where Y′ may be generated from Y as well as
quantum side information held by the adversary.
Definition 27. Let d be an integer and H a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. We say that a CPTP map
T : L(C2
d ⊗H) → L(C2d ⊗H′) has no fixed points if for all ρE ∈ D(H) and all y ∈ {0, 1}d it holds that
〈y|TrH′
(
T
(|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρE
)) |y〉 = 0.
Definition 28. Let k ≤ n, d, m be integers and ε > 0. A function nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
is a (k, ε) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor if for every (n, k) source ρXE ∈ D(C2n ⊗H) and any
CPTP map Adv : L(C2d ⊗H) → L(C2d ⊗H′) with no fixed points,
∥
∥σnmExt(X,Y)nmExt(X,Y′)YY′E′ −Um ⊗ σnmExt(X,Y′)YY′E′
)∥∥
1
≤ ε,
where
σYY′XE′ =
1
2d
∑
y
|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ (IdX ⊗Adv)(|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρXE) (12)
and σnmExt(X,Y)nmExt(X,Y′)YY′E′ is obtained from σYY′XE′ by (classically) computing nmExt(X, Y) and
nmExt(X, Y′) in ancilla registers and tracing out X.
Eq. (12) in Definition 28 requires that the seed Y is uniformly distributed and independent from (X, E).
We note that our construction satisfies a stronger condition where the conclusion holds even if it is only
required that Y is uniformly distributed and X − E− Y is a Markov chain.
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4.2 Advice generator
Given integers n, d and ε > 0, we define a function AdvGen : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}a, where
a = a(n, d, ε), which we call an advice generator. To this end we make use of the following building
blocks. Let d, d1 ≤ d, m, k and ε0 be parameters of the procedure, q a prime power, and Fq the finite field
with q elements.
• Let ECC : Fdq → Fmq be an error correcting code with relative-distance 1− γ. We identify {0, 1}d
with the corresponding subset of Fdq .
• Let Ext0 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}log m be a (k, ε0) strong quantum-proof extractor. We identify
the output of Ext0 with an element of {1, . . . , m}.
Set a = d1 + ⌊log q⌋ and define
AdvGen(x, y) = y1 ◦ ECC(y)Ext0(x,y1), (13)
where y1 is the length d1 prefix of the d-bit string y. In (13), by ECC(y)Ext0(x,y1) we mean the following:
interpret Ext0(x, y1) as an index i ∈ {1, . . . , m}; ECC(y)Ext0(x,y1) then stands for the i-th entry in the
codeword ECC(y), interpreted as a log(q)-bit string.
Proposition 29. Suppose X, Y and Y′ are such that X− E−YY′ is a quantum Markov chain with (Y, E) ∼
(Ud, E) and Hmin(X|E) ≥ k. Assume that Y 6= Y′ (with probability 1). Let G = AdvGen(X, Y),
G′ = AdvGen(X, Y′), I = Ext0(X, Y1), I ′ = Ext0(X, Y′1), and define H = (G′, G, I ′, I, Y′1, Y1). Then,
for any δ > 0 the following hold:
(i) H is an (X, E, YY′) history, and X − EH− YY′ is a quantum Markov chain;
(ii) Pr(G = G′) = O(γ +√ε0);
(iii) Hδmin(Y|EH) ≥ d− 2a −O(log(1/δ));
(iv) Hδmin(X|EH) ≥ k − 2 log m−O(log(1/δ)).
Proof. We first verify (i). Note that I, I ′ are deterministic functions of Y1, Y′1, respectively, and of X. Second,
G, G′ are deterministic functions of I, I ′, which precede G, G′ in H, and of Y, Y′. Thus, H is indeed an
(X, E, YY′) history. Item (i) then follows by Lemma 16. Items (iii) and (iv) follow directly from the chain
rule, the length of G, G′, and the output length of Ext0.
Finally we need to show (ii), i.e. that Pr(G = G′) = O(γ +√ε0) under our assumption Pr(Y 6=
Y′) = 1. Consider any possible fixing of the variables Y1, Y′1 to strings y1, y′1 respectively. Clearly, if
y1 6= y′1 then G 6= G′, and so we may assume that y1 = y′1, in which case I = I ′ (with probability
1). As ECC has relative distance 1 − γ, for a uniformly random index i ∈ {1, . . . , m} the probability
that ECC(Y)i = ECC(Y′)i is bounded above by O(γ). Using that Ext0 is a (k, ε0) strong quantum-proof
extractor, except with probability √ε0 over y1 ∼ Y1 it holds that
(Ext0(X, y1), E) ≈√ε0 (U, E). (14)
Thus at the cost of aggregating √ε0 to the total error, we may consider only y1 that satisfy (14). Together
with the error O(γ) from ECC, this completes the proof.
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Procedure nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
Let ε > 0, a = O(log3(n/ε)), and AdvGen : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}a the advice generator from
Corollary 30 set with error guarantee ε.
Let δ = 2−O(a) · ε and AdvCB : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}d × {0, 1}a → {0, 1}d/8 the correlation breaker with
advice from Section 3.4 set with error guarantee δ.
Let d2 = O(log2(n/ε5) · log d) be such that d2 = Ω(a), ε5 = 2−Ω(a) and Ext5 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d2 →
{0, 1}d the (2d, ε5) strong quantum-proof extractor from Theorem 9.
Let Ext6 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d/8 → {0, 1}k/4 be the (k/2, ε) strong quantum-proof extractor from Theo-
rem 9.
Let X ∈ {0, 1}n and Y ∈ {0, 1}d be random variables. Perform the following steps:
1. Compute G = AdvGen(X, Y).
2. Let Y2 be the length-d2 prefix of Y, and set T = Ext5(X, Y2).
3. Compute S = AdvCB(Y, T, G).
4. Return O = Ext6(X, S).
Figure 3: The quantum-proof non-malleable extractor.
Let ε > 0. By instantiating Proposition 29 with the quantum proof extractor Ext0 from Theorem 9 when
set with error guarantee ε0 = O(ε2) and that has seed length d1 = O(log3(n/ε)), as well as with the error
correcting code from Theorem 14, that has relative distance 1− γ = 1−O(ε), alphabet size q = O(ε−2),
and rate Ω(ε), we readily conclude the following.
Corollary 30. Let k, n, d be integers, ε > 0, and AdvGen as in (13). Suppose X, Y and Y′ are such that
X− E−YY′ is a quantum Markov chain with (Y, E) ∼ (Ud, E) and Hmin(X|E) ≥ k. Assume that Y 6= Y′
with probability 1. Let G = AdvGen(X, Y), G′ = AdvGen(X, Y′). Then, there exists an (X, E, YY′)
history H such that for any δ > 0 the following hold:
(i) |G| = a = O(log3(n/ε));
(ii) Pr(G = G′) ≤ ε;
(iii) Hδmin(Y|EH) ≥ d− 2a −O(log(1/δ)); and
(iv) Hδmin(X|EH) ≥ k − 2 log(log(n)/ε)−O(log(1/δ)).
4.3 The construction
The final construction of our non-malleable extractor combines the advice generator AdvGen from Sec-
tion 4.2 with the correlation breaker with advice AdvCB from Section 3.4. It is described in Figure 3.
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Theorem 31. There exists a universal constant r ≥ 1 such that for all integers n, k and for any ε > 0 such
that k = Ω(logr(n/ε)), the procedure nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m described in Figure 3 is a
(k, ε) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor with d = O(logr(n/ε)) and m = k/4.
Before proving Theorem 31 we prove the following claim.
Claim 32. Let n, m, d be integers, 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ d, and Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m a strong
(k, ε) quantum-proof extractor. Let X − E − Y be a quantum Markov chain such that HεXmin(X|E) ≥
k + 4 log(1/ε) and HεYmin(Y|E) ≥ d− ∆. Then
‖ρExt(X,Y)YE −Um ⊗ ρYE‖1 ≤ 10 · 2∆/2ε1/8 + 6(εX + εY).
Proof. We prove the claim under the assumption that Hmin(X|E) ≥ k + log(1/
√
ε) and Hmin(Y|E) ≥
d − ∆, obtaining an error of 4 · 2∆/2ε1/4. The final claim then follows by observing that the result can be
understood as a 2-source extractor in the Markov model in the sense of [AFPS15], and a direct application
of [AFPS15, Lemma 17].
Using the decomposition (3) of a quantum Markov state, we can write
ρXEY = ∑
t
∑
x,y
p(t)p(x|t)p(y|t) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxtE1 ⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗ ρ
yt
E2
⊗ |y〉〈y|.
Moreover our assumptions imply that the conditions Hmin(X|E1T) ≥ k+ 12 log(1/ε) and Hmin(Y|E2T) ≥
d − ∆ both hold. Thus by Markov’s inequality and a union bound, with probability at least 1− 2√ε over
t ∼ T both conditions
Hmin(X|E1, T = t) ≥ k and Hmin(Y|E2, T = t) ≥ d− ∆− 1
2
log(1/ε) (15)
hold. Call any t such that (15) holds “good”. Using the first condition in (15) and the definition of strong
extractor, for any good t it holds that
Ey∼Ud‖ρExt(X,y)Et1Eyt2 −Um ⊗ ρEt1Eyt2 ‖1 ≤ ε.
where we could adjoin register Eyt2 since conditioned on fixed y and t it is in tensor product with the re-
mainder of the system, and Tr(ρytE2) = 1. By Markov’s inequality, for any δ > 0 a fraction at most δ of all
y ∈ {0, 1}d are such that ‖ρ
Ext(X,y)Et1E
yt
2
−Um ⊗ ρEt1Eyt2 ‖1 ≥ ε/δ; let Bt be the set of such y. Using the
second condition in (15), for y ∼ p(·|t) and t good the probability that y ∈ Bt is at most 2∆δ/
√
ε. Thus for
good t
Ey∼p(·|t)‖ρExt(X,y)Et1Eyt2 −Um ⊗ ρEt1Eyt2 ‖1 ≤ ε/δ + 2
∆δ/
√
ε.
Bounding this quantity by 1 for t that are not good, we have shown
‖ρExt(X,Y)YE1TE2 −Um ⊗ ρYE1TE2‖1 ≤ 2
√
ε + ε/δ + 2∆δ/
√
ε.
Choosing δ = ε3/42−∆/2 completes the argument.
Proof of Theorem 31. Let ρXEY be such that X − E− Y is a quantum Markov chain with Hmin(X|E) ≥ k
and (Y, E) ∼ (Ud, E). Let H be the Hilbert space associated with system E and Adv : L(C2d ⊗H) →
L(C2
d ⊗H) a CPTP map with no fixed points (Definition 27). Let σXEYY′ be defined as in (12), and note
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that X − E−YY′ is a quantum Markov chain. For the remainder of the proof all quantities are evaluated on
the state σ.
By Corollary 30 applied with δ as defined in Figure 3, there exists an (X, E, YY′) history H1 that
contains G, G′ such that
• Pr(G = G′) ≤ ε;
• Hδmin(Y|EH1) ≥ d− 2a −O(log(1/δ)); and
• Hδmin(X|EH1) ≥ k− 2 log(log(n)/ε)−O(log(1/δ)).
Let Y>2 be the length (d− d2) suffix of Y. By the data-processing inequality followed by the chain rule (2),
H2δmin(Y2|H1E) ≥ H2δmin(Y|Y>2H1E)
≥ Hδmin(Y|H1E)− (d− d2)−O(log(1/δ))
≥ d− 2a − (d− d2)−O(log(1/δ))
= d2 − 2a −O(log(1/δ))
= d2 −O(a).
Recall that T = Ext5(X, Y2). As X − H1E − Y2 is a quantum Markov chain and Ext5 a strong
quantum-proof extractor, Claim 32 implies that (T, Y2, H1E) ≈η1 (Ud, Y2, H1E) with η1 = 2O(a) · ε1/85 +
O(δ) = O(δ), provided the constant implicit in the definition of ε5 in Figure 3 is chosen large enough.
As T − Y2H1E − Y′2 is a quantum Markov chain, we may adjoin Y′2 and obtain (T, Y2, Y′2, H1E) ≈η1
(U, Y2, Y′2, H1E).
Note that TT′ − Y2Y′2H1E − YY′ is a Markov chain. Thus we may apply Theorem 26 with εX , εZ =
O(δ) and kX = d − O(a) ≥ d/2 to obtain (S, S′, H2E) ≈η2 (Ud/8, S′, H2E) for some (YY′, E, TT′)
history H2 that contains T, T′, H1, with η2 = 2O(a) · δ = O(ε). One can easily verify that the hypothesis of
Theorem 26 in the above application is met by taking d ≥ logr(n/ε) for a large enough constant r.
Recall that O′ = Ext6(X, S′). Further, S − S′H2E −O′ is a quantum Markov chain, and so we may
adjoin O′ to obtain (S, O′, S′, H2E) ≈η2 (Ud/8, O′, S′, H2E). By the chain rule (2),
H
O(δ)
min (X|O′, S′, H2E) ≥ Hδmin(X|H1E)− k/4− 7ab
≥ k/2 + Ω(log(1/ε)).
Thus, (O, S, O′, S′, H2E) ≈O(ε) (Uk/4, S, O′, S′, H2E), which concludes the proof.
5 Privacy amplification
In this section we show that the framework for constructing privacy amplification protocols introduced by
Dodis and Wichs [DW09] is secure against active quantum adversaries, provided it is instantiated with
a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor nmExt as defined in Section 4.1, and a quantum-proof strong
extractor Ext. The protocol is described in Figure 4; we call it Protocol DW.
Before defining the properties of correctness, privacy and security of the protocol we formalize the class
of active attacks for the adversary that we consider. Intuitively, the adversary has the following control
over the outcome of the protocol. First, it may possess initial quantum side information E about the weak
secret X shared by Alice and Bob. That is, it has a choice of a cq source ρXE, under the condition that
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Protocol DW
Let n, d1, d2, ℓ, m, t, k be integers and εMAC, εExt, εnmExt > 0.
Let MAC : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}t be a one-time εMAC-information-theoretically secure message
authentication code.
Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m be a strong (k− t− log(1/εExt), εExt) quantum-proof extractor.
Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}ℓ be a (k, εnmExt) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor.
It is assumed that both parties, Alice and Bob, have access to a shared random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n .
1. Alice samples a uniform YA ∼ Ud1 . She sends YA to Bob. She computes Z = nmExt(X, YA).
2. Bob receives Y′A from Alice. He samples a uniform YB ∼ Ud2 , and computes Z′ =
nmExt(X, Y′A) and σ = MAC(Z′, YB). He sends (YB, σ) to Alice. Bob then reaches the
KEYDERIVED state and outputs RB = Ext(X, YB).
3. Alice receives (Y′B, σ′) from Bob. If σ′ = MAC(Z, Y′B) she reaches the KEYCONFIRMED state
and outputs RA = Ext(X, Y′B). Otherwise she outputs RA =⊥.
Figure 4: The Dodis-Wichs privacy amplification protocol.
Hmin(X|E) is sufficiently large. Second, the adversary may intercept and modify any of the messages
exchanged. In Protocol DW there are only two messages exchanged, YA from Alice to Bob and (YB, σ)
from Bob to Alice. To each of these messages the adversary may apply an arbitrary transformation, that
may depend on its side information E. We model the two possible attacks, one for each message, as CPTP
maps T1 : L(C2
d1 ⊗H) → L(C2d1 ⊗H) and T2 : L(C2d2 ⊗ C2t ⊗H) → L(C2d2 ⊗ C2t ⊗H), where H
denotes the Hilbert space associated with system E. Note that we may always assume that H is large enough
for the adversary to keep a local copy of the messages it sees, if it so desires.
More formally, we define an active attack for the adversary as follows.
Definition 33. An active attack on Protocol DW is specified by
• A cq state ρXE ∈ D(C2n ⊗H) such that Hmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k;
• A CPTP map T1 : L(C2d1 ⊗H) → L(C2d1 ⊗H);
• A CPTP map T2 : L(C2d2 ⊗C2t ⊗H) → L(C2d2 ⊗C2t ⊗H).
Given an active attack (ρXE, T1, T2) we instantiate random variables YA, Z, Y′A, YB, Z′, σ, Y′B, σ′ and RA, RB
in the obvious way, as defined in the protocol and taking into account the maps T1 and T2, applied succes-
sively to determine Y′A and (Y′B, σ′).
We formally define the correctness and security requirements for the protocol, following Definition 18
in [DW09].
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Definition 34. Let (ρXE, T1, T2) be an active attack for the adversary in Protocol DW, and RA, RB random
variables obtained as prescribed in the protocol (under the attack). Let V = YAYBΣ be a random variable
which denotes the transcript of the entire protocol execution as seen by the adversary.
We require that the protocol satisfies the following three properties:
• (Correctness) If both T1 and T2 are the identity map then Bob reaches the KEYDERIVED state, Alice
reaches the KEYCONFIRMED state, and RA = RB with probability 1.
• (Key Privacy) (RB, V, E) ≈ε (Um, V, E).
• (Key Authenticity) Pr(RA /∈ {RB,⊥}) ≤ ε.
Theorem 35. Let k, t and εMAC, εExt, εnmExt be parameters of Protocol DW, as specified in Figure 4. Let
nmExt be a (k, εnmExt) quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, Ext a strong (k − t − log(1/εExt), εExt)
quantum-proof extractor, and MAC an εMAC-information-theoretically secure one-time message authenti-
cation code. Then for any active attack (ρXE, T1, T2) such that Hmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k the DW privacy amplifi-
cation protocol described in Figure 4 is correct and satisfies the conditions of key privacy and authenticity
with ε = O(εExt + εnmExt + εMAC).
Before giving the proof of the theorem we discuss a typical setting of parameters. In the context of
quantum key distribution it will typically be the case that the initial min-entropy Hmin(X|E) can be assumed
to be linear, Hmin(X|E) ≥ αn for some α > 0. In this case we may achieve security ε = 2−cn for some
small enough c > 0 by instantiating Ext using the strong quantum-proof extractor from Theorem 9 with
a linear seed length and nmExt using the quantum-proof non-malleable extractor from Theorem 31, again
with linear seed length. This will result in a protocol with linear communication and exponentially small
security that produces a shared key of length 14 Hmin(X|E). In other settings Hmin(X|E) may only be
polylogarithmic in n. In this case for any ε = poly−1(n) we can use a strong quantum-proof extractor and
a non-malleable extractor with polylogarithmic seed length, resulting in a protocol with polylogarithmic
communication and inverse polynomial security that produces a shared key of length 14 Hmin(X|E).
Proof of Theorem 35. Let (ρXE, T1, T2) be an active attack such that Hmin(X|E) ≥ k. Correctness is clear.
We first observe that since the only random variable in V correlated with X is σ, which has length t,
it follows from Lemma 5 that HεExtmin(X|VE) ≥ k − t − c log(1/εExt) for some constant c > 0. We may
then use Lemma 10, together with the assumption that Ext is a strong quantum-proof extractor, to conclude
that (RB, V, E) ≈ε (Um, V, E), as long as ε is such that ε = O(εExt). This establishes the property of key
privacy.
Let ρY′AYAXE′ denote the joint state of Y′A, YA (which represents a local copy of YA kept by Alice),
X, and Eve’s registers after her first map T1 has been applied. Further decompose ρ as a sum of sub-
normalized densities ρ=Y′AYAXE′ , corresponding to conditioning on Y
′
A = YA, and ρ⊥Y′AYAXE′ , corresponding to
conditioning on Y′A 6= YA.
Conditioned on Y′A = YA, by definition of a MAC the probability that (Y′B, σ′) 6= (YB, σ) and Alice
reaches the KEYCONFIRMED state is at most εMAC. If (Y′B, σ′) = (YB, σ) then RA = RB, so that in this
case key authenticity holds with error at most εMAC.
Now suppose Y′A 6= YA. Consider a modified adversary Adv′ that keeps a copy of YA, applies the map
T1, and if Y′A = YA replaces Y′A with a uniformly random string that is distinct from YA. This adversary
implements a CPTP map T1 that has no fixed point. By the assumption that nmExt is a quantum proof
non-malleable extractor,
ρ′nmExt(X,YA)nmExt(X,Y′A)YAY′AE′ ≈εnmExt Um ⊗ ρ
′
nmExt(X,Y′A)YAY
′
AE
′ , (16)
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where here Y′AE′ is defined as the output system of the map T′E implemented by Adv
′
. Conditioned on
YA 6= Y′A the maps T1 and T′1 are identical, thus it follows from (16) and the definition of ρ⊥ that
ρ⊥nmExt(X,YA)nmExt(X,Y′A)YAY′AE′ ≈εnmExt Um ⊗ ρ
⊥
nmExt(X,Y′A)YAY
′
AE
′ ,
where now the states are sub-normalized. Since Z′ = nmExt(X, Y′A) this means that the key used by
Alice to verify the signature in step 3. of Protocol DW is (up to statistical distance εnmExt) uniform and
independent of the key used by Bob to make the signature. For a uniform key Z and any message Y′B,
MAC(Z, Y′B) ≈εMAC Ut. Therefore the probability for Alice to reach the KEYCONFIRMED state in this case
is at most εnmExt + εMAC + 2−t.
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